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CHAPTER FIVE
Winners and Losers in a 
Free Trade Area between the 
United States and MERCOSUR
MARCEL VAILLANT1 AND ALVARO ONS2 
1. INTRODUCTION
Three successive summits of heads of state and governments of the
Americas and six ministerial meetings have established the terms for carry-
ing forward and concluding negotiations for the creation of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should come into force in the sec-
ond half of this decade. A renewed impulse has been given to hemisphere
negotiations, which could mean a significant change in trade and econom-
ic relationships within the continent and also with the rest of the world.
In international trade negotiations, a priority objective for the MER-
COSUR countries is to improve their market access conditions in high-
income countries, so as to achieve better export performance. The new
strategies are oriented toward establishing preferential trading arrange-
ments with the industrialized economies. The MERCOSUR countries
are involved in various trade negotiations, among which those with the
United States stand out.
However, the process of gaining increased access to the big markets of
North America will also lead to a reduction in differentials in the region-
al trade preferences of the four MERCOSUR countries. The FTAA
negotiations would result in important consequences for the foreign trade
of each of the countries in the region and also for their economic per-
formance as a function of their trade patterns, in particular those within
the region and with the United States.
There has been growing skepticism about the likelihood that a free
trade area will be constituted on the announced date. From the Initiative
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of the Americas at the beginning of the 1990s, through the Summit of the
Americas in Miami in 1994, and up to the Summit of Quebec in 2001,
the time invested in the negotiation process has not yielded definite results
for the MERCOSUR countries. Market access to the United States is still
difficult, and the situation is worsening in some industries, such as agri-
cultural products; an illustration of this was Farm Bill 2002. The FTAA is
turning out to be a very long negotiation process with an “infinite” agen-
da of issues (relative to negotiation capacities) and a big and heterogeneous
group of countries (34). The advantages of the FTAA strategy with respect
to multilateral negotiation have not yet become clear.
Up to now, the main output of the FTAA process has been the produc-
tion and exchange of information, and the construction of a specific agen-
da of the many points involved in the negotiations. The many meetings and
the exchange of information have had a positive impact on the countries in
the region in terms of a learning process about new trade issues; for many
of them there is also a clear need to deepen structural reforms and build
new domestic institutions in order to participate in the agreement.
The FTAA negotiations have been carried on with a plurilateral
methodology, but some signs of bilateralism have been evident, specifi-
cally some parallel bilateral initiatives from the United States to individ-
ual countries or blocs.
Unlike the European Union strategy, in which trade negotiations with
other trade blocs in South America (the Andean Community and MER-
COSUR) are viewed positively, the United States has resisted this
approach and prefers to negotiate in the plurilateral FTAA scenario or with
individual countries (Chile and, more recently, Uruguay). There is a weak
antecedent for negotiations with a bloc, the Rose Garden Agreement of
1991, which is also known as the “4+1” agreement (Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay with the United States). The very name of the
agreement is a sign of US resistance to recognizing the MERCOSUR
(even after 1994, when the MERCOSUR crystallized as a customs union)
as a single partner that could be party to bilateral trade negotiations.
Without a doubt the most important and at the same time most com-
plicated trade negotiation that the United States has undertaken at the
continental level is with Brazil. Brazil has shown real commitment to the
MERCOSUR strategy, but seems to lack conviction in its negotiations
with the United States, which would point to a weakness in the consis-
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tency of the regional trade bloc. For all these reasons, it is important to
evaluate the resistance and the reciprocal opportunities that each MER-
COSUR country and the United States would have in the constitution of
a bilateral free trade area (FTA). In spite of the current lack of political real-
ism, the evaluation of these forces is important; on the other hand, the
likelihood of success in the trade negotiations currently under way is not
high in any of the different scenarios in which the reciprocal trade liberal-
ization processes are taking place (multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral).
The objective of this study is to construct two lists of products, one
expansive (opportunities) and one defensive (perils), for each of the par-
ticipants in the United States-MERCOSUR agreement. We argue that a
government would have incentives to include in the trade liberalization
agreement those industries on the opportunities list and to exclude those
on the perils list.
The general focus here is of a mercantilist type; it implicitly assumes
that exports are good and imports are bad. In fact, it is known that, in
terms of an evaluation of the effects on economic welfare, exactly the
opposite is true. However, in trade negotiations the mercantilist focus is
often equally or more decisive than considerations of added welfare. Trade
negotiations are in their very essence mercantilist.
The idea is to identify the private interest groups that are for or against
the trade arrangements between the United States and the MERCOSUR
countries. The importance of explicitly introducing the list of products to
be excluded from the negotiations has been pointed out in the modern
literature on the political economy of trade policy (Grossman and
Helpman 1995). From this perspective, the exceptions list improves the
chances of signing an FTA because it makes it more palatable in political
terms. The general results of these models are summed up by the fact that
the ideal exceptions list of each partner is like an index of the compara-
tive advantages of the other. As Grossman and Helpman (1995) explained,
the conditions needed for the political viability of an FTA may contradict
those that ensure its social desirability. The industries with more potential
for trade creation, for which the FTA implies an improvement in welfare,
are those in which there will be more resistance in the import substitu-
tion country to accepting their inclusion in the agreement.
In a previous paper we applied this idea to the eventual trade agree-
ments between the European Union and the South American countries,
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but we only considered perils to regional exports, and only studied the
unilateral stances of the developing countries (see Vaillant and Ons 2002).
In this study, we extend the analysis by also considering the effects of the
FTA in each domestic market; that is, we take into account a country’s
production interests inside its own market, in the regional market (for the
MERCOSUR countries), and the potential expansion of its exports to
the new partner. We propose a general methodology, and we study the
effects of the eventual preferential trading agreement on exports and pro-
duction on both sides (MERCOSUR and the United States). We suggest
an industry typology of the effects of the FTA on trade inside MERCO-
SUR (the United States) and on exports from MERCOSUR (the United
States) to the United States (MERCOSUR).
Our method consists in the analysis of trade flows and trade policy, and
reaches conclusions about the unilateral stances of MERCOSUR coun-
tries and the United States with respect to a bilateral FTA. A mercantilist
perspective has been adopted, since it is the most pertinent from a polit-
ical economy point of view. We explicitly include interests inside the
United States, and so we can analyze the position of the US government
in relation to the agreement.
ECONOMIC AND WELFARE EFFECTS 
OF AN FTA:TYPOLOGY OF CASES 
The production framework is specified as in a specific factors trade
model.3 There are n+1 industries in each country: a numeraire industry
(0) that only uses the mobile factor (labor), and n other industries that use
labor and a sector-specific factor.4 All goods are produced with constant
returns to scale, and there are fixed endowments of all specific factors.
Hence the assignment decision is only made for the labor factor.
The consumers within each economy have identical preferences that
are suitably represented by a quasilinear utility function. Each individual
is endowed with labor, and possibly with some sector-specific factor. The
consumer receives a lump-sum transfer from the government, which cor-
responds to the uniform redistribution of tariff revenue.
The owners of specific factors are all organized into lobby groups, and
ownership is highly concentrated in the population. From the political
economy point of view, the relevant economic interests are given by the
owners of the specific factor in a certain sector (the producers), who seek
 
Winners and Losers in a Free Trade Area Between the US and MERCOSUR
| 115 |
to maximize their own industry profit function, and those consumers
who are only endowed with labor.
The economy is small, and therefore world prices are given exoge-
nously. Without loss of generality, all international prices ( I 
*) are nor-
malized to one. Initially, the most favored nation (MFN) principle holds.
The trade policy (t i 
z) is a set of instruments that can directly affect the
domestic prices ( i 
z) of export and import goods. The initial domestic
price of any export good is one (the international price) while import
goods may be taxed.5
Countries A and B exhibit the qualitative features mentioned above, and
they are negotiating an FTA. In this context, the relevant cases are given by
those products which are initially imported by at least one of the countries,
subject to an MFN tariff rate different from zero. If both countries export
a particular good in the initial equilibrium, then domestic prices are simi-
lar to the international price, and the trade agreement would have no effect
on production, consumption, or bilateral trade. In this case, the countries
could compete in third markets. Without loss of generality, an industry is
considered in which the following condition holds: i 
A > t i 
B ≥ 1. That
is, A is an importer of good i, while B can be a less inefficient importer 
( i 
B > 1) or an efficient producer ( i 
B = 1). Three cases are distinguished
according to the size of country B’s aggregate supply of good i: enhanced
protection, reduced protection, and an intermediate case. In each case, two
different situations are studied depending on production efficiency in part-
ner B. The economic effects of the FTA on producer and consumer prices
in each economy are derived, as well as the consequences for the welfare of
the different actors and countries.
Enhanced Protection
For a particular industry i, the total supply from country B (xi
B) and the
excess demand of country A (mi
A) are presented in Figure 1. In this good,
country B is small with respect to country A as a result of a relatively small
endowment of the specific factor in B.
At price i 
A (the initial domestic price in A), the aggregate supply
from country B is not enough to satisfy all the import demand of coun-
try A; xi
B( i 
A) < mi
A ( i 
A). Therefore, under an eventual FTA, A has
to continue importing from the rest of the world (ROW) and its domes-
tic price remains unchanged. The producers in B prefer to sell in A’s
Marcel Vaillant and Alvaro Ons
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market at price i 
A which is higher than that which they face in their
own domestic market ( i 
B). Thus, producers in B divert all their pro-
duction to A’s market, while consumers in B have to satisfy all their
demand by purchasing from the ROW at the initial price. In conclusion,
the only effect of the FTA in terms of prices is the increment in those
paid to the producers in the more efficient country (see Table 1[a]).
Producers in B benefit from the higher protection granted to the pro-
ducers in A (enhanced protection).
This situation is presented in Figure 2, which shows the aggregate sup-
ply and the aggregate demand (D) of good i in each market. In the initial
equilibrium, the consumers in A satisfy all their excess demand for good
i, Di
A( i 
A) – xi
A( i 
A), by purchasing from the ROW at the interna-
tional price plus the MFN tariff rate. In the event of an FTA, the con-
sumers in A import an amount xi
B( i 
A) from B. So the only effect of
the FTA in terms of A’s welfare is a tariff revenue (TR) loss that nega-
tively affects the consumers in A, since, under an FTA, tariffs are not
levied on imports from B (see equation I.1, Appendix I).
Country A’s welfare reduction corresponds to the area 1+2 in Figure
2. This loss reflects the adverse effects of trade diversion (TD). In this par-
ticular case, an efficient producer from the ROW is substituted by a pro-
tected and less efficient supplier from inside the FTA. However, the
amount of this welfare loss in country A depends on its own protection
Figure 1. Country A’s Import Demand and Country B’s Total 
Supply (small supply case)
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level, not on the efficiency level of country B’s suppliers (the protection
level in B does not affect the size of the area 1+2).
On the other hand, consumers and producers in B improve their welfare.
The producers in B benefit from their preferential access to country A’s pro-
tected market (see equation I.2, Appendix I). This increment in the profits
of the specific factor owners in B corresponds to area 3 in Figure 2.
The consumers in B receive a bigger lump-sum transfer as a result of
the increment in the tariff revenue which is represented by area 4 in
Figure 2 (see equation I.3, Appendix I). Under an FTA, initial domestic
sales by country B’s producers, xi
B( i 
B), are replaced by imports from
the ROW, which remain taxed.
The total welfare improvement in country B is obtained by adding the
gains of producers and consumers; areas 3+4 in Figure 2 (see equation I.4,
Appendix I).
Table 1. Prices Before and After the Creation of the FTA
Agent
(a) Enhanced Protection
Producers
Producers
Consumers
Consumers
(b) Reduced Protection
Producers
Producers
Consumers
Consumers
(c) Intermediate Case
Producers
Producers
Consumers
Consumers
Country
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
Pre FTA
i B
i A
i B
i A
i B
i A
i B
i A
i B
i A
i B
i A
FTA
i A
i A
i B
i A
i B
i B
i B
i B
i 
i 
i B 
i 
Prices
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From the point of view of the zone as a whole, the welfare loss in
country A is bigger than the welfare gain in country B (see equation I.5,
Appendix I). The welfare loss of the zone as a whole is given by area 5
in Figure 2.
If the economic size of the zone is small, the changes in trade flows
with the ROW have no effect on international prices. However, it is
interesting to determine if the amounts traded with the ROW decrease
or increase. ROW exports to country A decrease by the amount of:
x i
B ( i 
A). ROW exports to country B increase by the amount of :
x i
B( i
B). The net effect is a reduction of ROW exports of the amount
of: x i
B ( i 
A) – x i
B ( i 
B) > 0.
Figure 2. Supply and Demand Curves of Countries A and B
in the Enhanced Protection Case with B Inefficient
Winners and Losers in a Free Trade Area Between the US and MERCOSUR
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Country B Is Efficient ( i 
B = 1)
If the international price equals the domestic price in country B,
then the domestic market in B is not protected, and two kinds of spe-
cialization for the producers in B are possible: an “import substitution”
industry or an export industry.6
The case in which i is an import substitution industry in B can be
analyzed with the aid of Figure 2. Area 4 disappears since i 
B = 1. 7
That is, the MFN tariff imposed by the government of B on the
imports of good i is zero (   i 
B = 0). The welfare loss in A due to the
reduction in tariff revenue remains the same. However, in country B
only the producers improve their welfare, and the zone as a whole loses
more than in the previous situation. The greater welfare increment for
producers in B is not sufficient to compensate for the absence of an
increment in tariff revenue. The reduction of ROW exports is given by
the amount of: x i
B ( i 
A) – x i
B (1) > 0 (which is greater than in the
previous case).
In country B, industry i could also be an export industry. This kind
of specialization could be obtained by starting from a situation like that
shown in Figure 2, and making a suitable displacement to the right of
the supply curve of country B.8 In Figure 3, the good i is exported by
country B at the international price.
In country A, the size of the welfare loss depends on the fraction of
tariff revenue that is transferred to the producers in country B (area 1
in Figure 3). In country B, the producers’ profits increase (area 3 in
Figure 3) while tariff revenue does not change. The welfare loss of the
zone as a whole corresponds to area 5 in Figure 3.
When country B is an efficient producer and exporter, the amount of
the reduction in ROW exports to country A depends on the amount that
country A imports from country B in the initial equilibrium. The maxi-
mum reduction equals: xi
B ( i 
A) (country A does not import from B in
the initial equilibrium). The minimum reduction equals:
xi
B( i 
A) – [xi
B (1) – D i
B(1)] (country A imports all country B’s excess
supply in the initial equilibrium). On the other hand, ROW exports to
country B increase by the amount of: Di
B(1). The net effect is negative, and
the reduction is between: [xi
B( i
A) – xi
B(1)] and [x i
B( i 
A) – D i
B (1)].
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Reduced Protection
Country B’s total supply and country A’s import demand for good i are
presented in Figure 4, as in a reduced protection case. In industry i, coun-
try B is big with respect to country A, which is the price taker country.
At the lowest initial domestic price ( i 
B), the aggregate supply of
country B can satisfy all of country A’s import demand; xi
B( i 
B) > mi
A
( i 
B). Then, under an FTA, A stops importing from the ROW and its
domestic price falls to i 
B. The producers in A enjoy less protection
under the FTA than in the initial equilibrium (reduced protection).
The producers in B are the only foreign suppliers in A’s market, and
they also satisfy at least a part of their domestic market. The price paid
by consumers in B for good i and the price obtained by producers in B
remain unchanged at the level i 
B. The price changes are summarized
in Table 1[b]).
Figure 3. Supply and Demand Curves of Countries A and B
in the Enhanced Protection Case with B Efficient
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Country B Is Less Efficient than the ROW ( i 
B>1)
Figure 5 shows the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand for
good i in each market. There are three effects in country A: a reduction
in profits for the specific factor owners; an increment in the consumers’
surplus; and a reduction in tariff revenue. The producers’ loss in country
A, which results from the reduction in the domestic price that follows
increased competition from inside the FTA, is given by area 1 in Figure
5 (see equation I.6, Appendix I). This price variation implies an incre-
ment in the consumers’ surplus, represented by the area 1+2+3+4 in
Figure 5 (see equation I.7, Appendix I). The consumers in A are also neg-
atively affected since, under the FTA, all their imports originate in B, and
therefore the tariff revenue in industry i falls to zero. The tariff revenue
loss is captured by the area 3+5 in Figure 5 (see equation I.8, Appendix
I). The net effect on consumers’ welfare in country A is ambiguous. The
same occurs with the net effect on country A’s aggregate welfare.
The analysis above can be developed in terms of traditional trade cre-
ation and trade diversion definitions. In this case, an inefficient domes-
tic producer has been substituted by a less inefficient supplier from
inside the FTA (trade creation), and an efficient producer from the
ROW has been substituted by a protected and less efficient supplier
from inside the FTA (trade diversion). The trade creation effect (TC)
Figure 4. Country A’s Import Demand and Country B’s 
Total Supply (big supply case)
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corresponds to the sum of areas 2 and 4 in Figure 5 (see equation I.9,
Appendix I), while the trade diversion effect (TD) corresponds to area
5 (see equation I.10, Appendix I). The sign of the net effect on coun-
try A’s aggregate welfare depends on the relative sizes of trade creation
gains and trade diversion losses (see equation I.11, Appendix I).
On the other hand, the only effect of the FTA in terms of country
B’s welfare is an increment in the tariff revenue which is given by area
6 in Figure 5 (see equation I.12, Appendix I). Country B has to import
from the ROW the same amount that its producers export to A under
the FTA.
The welfare of the zone as a whole unambiguously increases (see
equation I.13, Appendix I): the losses in A (TD, area 5) are a fraction
of the gains in B (area 6). That is, the joint welfare gain equals the sum
of areas 2 and 4, plus the difference between areas 6 and 5 (see figures
5 and 10 and equation I.14 Appendix I).
Figure 5. Supply and Demand Curves of Countries A and B in
the Reduced Protection Case with B Inefficient
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ROW exports to country A decrease by the amount of: m i
A ( i 
A) =
D i
A ( i 
A) – x i
A ( i 
A). ROW exports toward country B increase by
the amount of: m i
A( i
B). The net effect is an increment of ROW exports
of: m i
A ( i 
B) – m i
A ( i 
A) > 0.
Country B Is Efficient ( i 
B = 1)
Again, when the international price equals the domestic price in
country B, two kinds of specialization for the producers in B are possible:
an import substitution industry or an export industry.
The import substitution industry case can be analyzed with the aid of
Figure 5. Area 6 disappears since i 
B = 1.9 In country A, the reduction
in producers’ profits and the increment in the consumers’ surplus are
greater than in the previous situation, while the tariff revenue loss remains
unchanged. The welfare of the consumers in A and country A’s aggregate
welfare unambiguously increase (there is no trade diversion in this case).
Figure 6. Supply and Demand Curves of Countries A and B in
the Reduced Protection Case with B Efficient
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There is no effect on country B’s welfare, and the zone as a whole gains
more. The increment in ROW exports equals the amount: m i
A (1) – m
i
A ( i 
A) > 0 (which is greater than in the previous case).
The export industry case is presented in Figure 6 and the results are
almost the same. The profit reduction is given by area 1, the increment in
the consumers’ surplus corresponds to the area 1+2+3+4, and the tariff
revenue loss is represented by area 3. The consumers’ welfare gain in A
equals the sum of areas 1, 2, and 4. The welfare improvement in country
A equals the welfare improvement in the zone as a whole, and is given by
the sum of areas 2 and 4.
When country B is an efficient producer and exporter, the amount of
the reduction in ROW exports to country A depends on the amount that
country A imports from B in the initial equilibrium. The maximum reduc-
tion equals: mi
A ( i 
A) (country A does not import from B in the initial
equilibrium). The minimum reduction is zero (country A only imports
from B in the initial equilibrium). On the other hand, ROW exports to
country B increase by the amount of: mi
A(1). The net effect is an increment
of ROW exports between: [mi
A(1) – mi
A ( i 
A)] and mi
A(1).
Intermediate Case
Country B’s total supply and country A’s import demand for good i are
presented in Figure 7 as in the intermediate case in which both curves
matter in the determination of the producers’ price under the FTA ( i).
Figure 7. Country A’s Import Demand and Country B’s
Total Supply (intermediate case)
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The relative sizes of countries A and B mean that neither A nor B can
determine the new price by itself.
Only at the highest initial domestic price ( i 
A) can country B’s aggre-
gate supply satisfy all the import demand of country A; xi
B( i 
A) > mi
A
( i 
A) and xi
B( i 
B) < mi
A ( i 
B). Then, under an FTA, A stops import-
ing from the ROW and its domestic price falls to i. The producers in A
enjoy less protection under the FTA than in the initial equilibrium 
( i < i 
A) while the producers in B benefit from a higher price in A’s
market ( i > i 
B) (intermediate case). The producers in B are the only
foreign suppliers in A’s market and they do not sell in their own domestic
market. The price paid by consumers in B for good i remains unchanged at
the level i 
B. These price changes are summarized in Table 1(c).
Country B Is Less Efficient than the ROW ( i 
B>1)
Figure 8 shows the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand for
good i in each market. The constitution of an FTA has three effects in
country A: a reduction in the profits of the specific factor owners, an
increment in consumers’ surplus, and a reduction in tariff revenue.
The producers’ loss in country A, which results from the reduction in
their domestic price, is given by area 1 in Figure 8 (see equation I.15,
Appendix I). This price variation implies an increment in consumers’ sur-
plus, represented by area 1+2+3+4 in Figure 8 (see equation I.16,
Appendix I). The consumers in A are also negatively affected by the total
loss of tariff revenue in industry i, which is captured by area 3+5 in Figure
8 (see equation I.17, Appendix I).
The net effects on consumers’ welfare and on A’s aggregate welfare are
ambiguous. This can be shown in terms of trade creation and trade diver-
sion; the former corresponds to the sum of areas 2 and 4 (see equation
I.18, Appendix I), while the latter corresponds to area 5 (see equation
I.19, Appendix I). Again, the sign of the net effect on country A’s aggre-
gate welfare depends on the relative sizes of trade creation gains and trade
diversion losses (see equation I.20, Appendix I).
On the other hand, there are two positive effects in country B: the
producers increase their profits by selling more at a higher price (see equa-
tion I.21, Appendix I); and the consumers benefit from greater tariff rev-
enue since the initial domestic sales of B’s producers are replaced by
Marcel Vaillant and Alvaro Ons
| 126 |
imports from the ROW (see equation I.22, Appendix I). The total wel-
fare improvement in country B is obtained by adding the gains of pro-
ducers and consumers, areas 6 and 7, respectively, in Figure 8 (see equa-
tion I.23, Appendix I).
The welfare of the zone as a whole could increase or decrease depend-
ing on the relative sizes of country A’s losses and country B’s gains (see
equation I.24, Appendix I). Graphically, the zone welfare variation equals
the sum of areas 2 and 4, plus the difference between area 6+7 and area
5 (see Figure 8).
ROW exports to country A decrease by the amount of: m i
A ( i
A).
ROW exports to country B increase by the amount of: x i
B ( i 
B). The net
effect is a variation of ROW exports of x i
B ( i
B) – m i
A ( i 
A) which
could be positive or negative.
Country B Is Efficient ( i 
B = 1)
Figure 8. Supply and Demand Curves of Countries A and B in
the Intermediate Protection Case with B Inefficient
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The import substitution industry case can be analyzed with the aid of
Figure 8. Area 7 disappears since i 
B = 1.10 The effects in country A
remain unchanged from the previous case, while only the producers
improve their welfare in country B, and the zone as a whole is worse 
off than in the previous situation. The greater welfare increment for the
producers in B is not sufficient to compensate for the absence of
an increment in tariff revenue. The variation in ROW exports equals 
x i
B ( i
B) – m i
A ( i 
A).
The export industry case is presented in Figure 9 and the results are
almost the same.
The maximum reduction in ROW exports to country A equals:
mi
A ( i 
A). The minimum reduction is: mi
A( i 
A) – [xi
B (1) – D i
B(1)].
On the other hand, ROW exports to country B increase by the amount
of: Di
B(1). The net effect is a variation of ROW exports between:
[xi
B (1) – m i
A( i 
A)] and [Di
B(1)- mi
A ( i 
A)].
Figure 9. Supply and Demand Curves of Countries A and B in
the Intermediate Protection Case with B Efficient
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Table 2. FTA Welfare Effects
Agent
(a) Enhanced Protection
Consumers
Producers
Total
Consumers
Producers
Total
(b) Reduced Protection
Consumers
Producers
Total
Consumers
Producers
Total
(c) Intermediate Case
Consumers
Producers
Total
Consumers
Producers
Total
Country
A
A
A
B
B
B
Zone
ROW
A
A
A
B
B
B
Zone
ROW
A
A
A
B
B
B
Zone
ROW
B inefficient
Negative
Nil
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Could be negative
Negative or Positive
Negative
Negative or Positive
Positive
Nil
Positive
Positive
Could be positive
Negative or Positive
Negative
Negative or Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative or Positive
Could be negative or
positive
Change in welfare
B efficient
Negative
Nil
Negative
Nil
Positive
Positive
Negative
Could be negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Nil
Nil
Nil
Positive
Could be positive
Negative or Positive
Negative
Negative or Positive
Nil
Positive
Positive
Negative or Positive
Could be negative or
positive
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Distributive Welfare Effects: Comparison 
between Countries and Actors
Table 2 summarizes the welfare effects of an FTA in the different cases for
each actor (producer and consumer) and each country.
In the enhanced protection case, consumers in A always lose, produc-
ers in B always win, and consumers in B could win. Welfare in A always
decreases and welfare in B always increases. In spite of the fact that the
contribution of these industries to the welfare of the zone as a whole
decreases under the FTA, they are very good candidates for inclusion in
the agreement because no strong opposition is expected.
In the reduced protection case, producers in A always lose, consumers
in A could win or lose, and consumers in B could win. The welfare effect
could be positive or negative in A, while it could be positive in B. The
Figure 10. Zone’s Welfare Improvement with Reduced
Protection B Inefficient vs B Efficient
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zone as a whole always improves its welfare. However, in these kinds of
industries there is potentially strong opposition to their inclusion on the
list of liberalized goods (specifically from the producers in A).
Country A’s welfare improves, and the welfare of the zone increases
more, when country B is efficient. Figure 10 presents the welfare variation
in the zone as a whole according to the efficiency level in country B.
Finally, in the intermediate case some results depend on the particular
values of the parameters. Producers in A always lose, producers in B
always win, and consumers in B could win. Welfare in B always increas-
es. The effects on consumers’ welfare in A, on country A’s welfare, and
on joint welfare could be positive or negative, depending on the particu-
lar values of the parameters.
3. METHODOLOGY 
From the perspective of each of the participants in the MERCOSUR-
United States agreement, the FTA would mean a trade-off between the
gain in access to the new partner market and the loss in protection in those
markets where the new partner improves its access conditions. The first can
generate trade opportunities and the second can generate trade perils. In this
section, we outline the methodology for the construction of two lists of
products, one expansive (opportunities) and one defensive (perils). Thus, it
would be possible to design a guide for trade negotiations between the
United States and the countries of MERCOSUR that would establish
expansive and defensive priorities at the level of products for each of the
participants. The opportunities and perils analysis is interpreted in terms of
the typology introduced in the previous section, based on the effects of
integration in the different markets, in order to better identify the private
interest groups that are for or against the agreement. With this outcome, the
idea is to apply a political economy approach in the Grossman-Helpman
perspective to analyze the political viability of an FTA between the United
States and MERCOSUR.
Without loss of generality, we consider only two countries, A and B,
and assume that these countries are going to sign a free trade agreement
that could involve more participants.
The methodology involves three steps: the first selects industries
(Standardized International Trade Classification [SITC], 4 digits), the sec-
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ond selects products (Harmonized System [HS], 6 digits) within the
selected industries, and the third classifies the selected products.11 The first
step consists in identifying the industries where the greatest contractive or
expansive adjustments are expected due to the FTA creation (industries
with high trade complementarity). Then, products are chosen taking into
account the changes in trade policy that are implicit in the FTA, that is
to say, those products for which the agreement means an improvement in
preferential access to the other market (sensitive products). Finally, the
selected products are classified according to the eventual expansion in
exports (opportunities) and/or contraction in production (perils), estab-
lishing an explicit link with the three protection regimes defined above.
Industries with High Trade Complementarity
In line with the theoretical presentation, in each industry we should know
which country is the less efficient producer, since, under an FTA, it is
expected that this country will import products from the other in that
industry. For this purpose, one option could be to compare domestic prices
in both economies in each industry. However, the required level of data dis-
aggregation for working with domestic prices is too high, the availability of
price information is very limited, and consequently the statistical task is too
great. For this reason, an indirect methodology has been developed using
trade flows at industry level. The efficiency level of each country in each
industry is inferred from revealed comparative advantage indexes. If one
country has a revealed comparative disadvantage then it could potentially be
more inefficient than the international economy, while if the country reg-
isters a revealed comparative advantage then it could be inferred that the
good is produced at least as efficiently as in the international economy.
We defined as industries of interest, those in which country A (B) is
an exporter and country B (A) is an importer. This selection involves con-
sideration of the export profiles of A (B) together with the import pro-
files of B (A). We consider the industries (SITC Revision 2, 4 digits) in
which country A’s (B’s) exports show strong trade complementarity with
country B’s (A’s) imports. These are the industries that would have better
chances of exploiting the eventual improvement in access to the new
partner’s market. The industries of interest concept covers those in which
the differences in the conditions of production in the two markets that are
in the process of eliminating trade barriers are greatest. For this reason, it
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is logical to expect that these will be the industries in which the greatest
adjustments will occur, and at the same time these will be the industries
that most oppose or support the trade agreement.
Specifically, we use a trade complementarity index based on the “revealed
comparative advantage” index of trade specialization proposed by Balassa
(1965). For each industry, the trade complementarity index of the exports
of A (B) in the market of B (A) equals the product of the export specializa-
tion index of A (B) (comparative advantage index) and the import special-
ization index of B (A) (comparative disadvantage index). The export
(import) specialization index equals the ratio between the share of the indus-
try in a country’s total exports (imports) and the share of the industry in
world trade. When the export (import) specialization index is greater than
one, we say that the country is more export (import) oriented in that par-
ticular industry than the world average, and therefore we conclude that the
country has a comparative advantage (disadvantage) in that industry.
The industry set where country z is an exporter and country p is an
importer, that is, the “high trade complementarity set” for the exports
from z to p (HTCzp), is defined as:
Product i belongs to industry s and S is the universe of industries. Two
trade specialization indexes are used: XSs
z is the export specialization
index of country z in industry s; and MSs
p is the import specialization
index of country p in industry s.
The global high trade complementarity set (HTC) is the union of the
two subsets (   ).
12
We have selected as industries of inter-
est a subset of the industries with export trade complementarity greater
than one: those industries that also satisfy the condition that export and
import specializations are greater than one.
At this point we should stress some shortcomings of the methodology
that we are introducing:
1. The methodology is limited when it comes to the precision with
which industries are identified. These limitations could generate errors
that we can classify in two groups: errors by defect (some industries that
ought to be included are not in the selection), and errors by excess
(industries included that ought not to be in the selection). In the first
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group, the method does not permit identification of those industries in
which both countries produce with an import substitution specialization,
but one of them is more efficient than the other.13 In the second group,
a country could have a comparative disadvantage in one industry but pro-
duce in a way similar to the international economy. The second proposed
filter, which is applied in the next subsection, permits the solution of the
second problem, that of including more industries than are wanted.
2. Some other limitations could stem from the fact that the methodol-
ogy is based on indexes of comparative advantage that are of a “revealed”
type. Thus, as has been typically stated, we are assuming that the real pat-
tern of comparative advantage can be observed from trade data. In this
sense, the indexes could be biased due to existing trade policy barriers,
subsidies, geography, tastes, foreign direct investment, and so on., all of
which are not uniform across sectors and countries. However, we are still
interested in the patterns of specialization, beyond the factors that are
generating those patterns, since these indexes help us to map the private
interest groups that are for or against the FTA.
3. The trade specialization indexes are biased by economic size. That is,
bigger countries tend to have more diversified export and import structures,
and therefore the share of each industry in total imports and total exports,
and the average value of the index, tend to be lower. We tried to correct
for this bias, performing OLS regressions of the indexes (one for export and
one for import specialization) over economic size, and employing the cor-
responding residuals as the corrected trade specialization indexes.14
4. We are not identifying those products that are basically exchanged
on a regional basis; the type of products that do not travel long distances.
In those cases, the opportunities and perils would not be relevant.
The data source for this first step was the world trade flows (Feenstra
2000). Because of the structural nature of the variables involved in trade
specialization, we computed the indexes for averaged trade data for the
period 1990–1997 (1997 being the last year for which consistent infor-
mation on the world economy is available).
Trade Opportunities and Trade Perils
Without loss of generality, and in order to establish a link with Section 2,
we define the trade opportunities for country B (the more efficient coun-
try) and the trade perils for country A.
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Trade opportunities refer to the potential expansion of country B’s
exports as a result of the improvement in the access conditions to A’s mar-
ket, while trade perils refer to the potential displacement of domestic sales
of the producers in country A by exports from country B following that
eventual improvement. In the case of our study, the United States would
face trade perils in its domestic market while the MERCOSUR coun-
tries would face trade perils in the four regional markets (the “domestic
market” for the member countries). The MERCOSUR-United States
agreement would mean a reduction in the differential in regional trade
preferences with respect to US suppliers.
The construction of the opportunities and perils sets requires the prior
determination of what we call sensitive products.
The selection of sensitive products involves completing the selection of
the industries of interest with trade policy information and trade data at
a higher level of disaggregation (HS, 6 digits). In the previous subsection,
we applied a trade complementarity filter. Now we filter the HTCBA set
using information about ad valorem tariffs; it is a trade policy filter.
Specifically, we consider that a product (HS, 6 digits) is sensitive when the
following multiple condition is satisfied:
• the product belongs to an industry (SITC, 4 digits) that is included
in HTCBA,
• country B exports the product,
• country A imports the product, and  
• country A’s imports of that product from country B face an ad val-
orem tariff different from zero.
Thus, sensitive products are those that, being in HTCBA, would gain
improved conditions of access to the new partner market as a result of the
constitution of a free trade area. On the other hand, the product is not
sensitive when suppliers are currently faced with a zero tariff. The sensi-
tive products set when B is an exporter and A is an importer (SPBA), is:
where, Xi
B are country B’s total exports of product i; Mi
A are country
A’s total imports of product i; and ti
AB is the tariff rate imposed by the
government of A on the imports of product i from country B.15
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The additional data needed for carrying out the sensitive products
analysis came from different sources. We used a database of US trade
policy that includes the MFN tariffs (ad valorem equivalent of complete
MFN rate) and all the current trade preferences granted by the United
States to MERCOSUR countries.16 These data were obtained from the
United States International Trade Commission (USITC). The trade
policy of MERCOSUR countries (the MFN tariffs which are those
applied to imports from the United States) were supplied by the LAIA
General Secretariat. We averaged export and import data of the MER-
COSUR countries, and of the United States, at the HS 6-digit level
for the time period 1996–1998. The data were supplied by the LAIA
General Secretariat and the USITC, respectively.
There is another potential shortcoming that we should mention.
Since our analysis takes into account the universe of products, we
could not pay attention to some very detailed aspects of trade policy
that affect some of them specifically. That is, we are considering a sim-
plified trade policy and, therefore, ignoring things like the existence of
quotas, GSP requirements, and so on.
The sensitive products turn into trade opportunities for country B
when there is an expansion in its production led by exports to country
A. The opportunities set for B in A (OPBA) is:
The sensitive products turn into trade perils for A when there is a
displacement of domestic production in A led by imports from coun-
try B. The perils set for A generated from B (PEAB) is:
Taking into account these two definitions and the protection
regimes introduced in the previous section, we observe that for a par-
ticular product the enhanced protection case means an opportunity but
not a peril, the reduced protection case means a peril but not an
opportunity, and the intermediate case means an opportunity and a
peril. So it is possible to establish an explicit link between the two sec-
tions and to analyze the political economy consequences of the cre-
ation of an FTA in terms of the Grossman and Helpman model.
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The enhanced protection set when country B is the exporter
(ENBA) includes the products that constitute a trade opportunity for B
and are not a trade peril for country A.
The reduced protection set when country B is the exporter (REBA)
includes the products that constitute a trade peril for country A and are
not a trade opportunity for B.
Finally, the intermediate protection set when country B is the exporter
(IN) includes the products that constitute a trade opportunity for country
B and a trade peril for country A.
The essential aspects of the methodology and its link with the protec-
tion regime analysis are captured by Figure 11.
Figure 11. Opportunities and Perils vis-à-vis Protection Regimes
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The Measure of the Trade Protection Regime
The protection regime after the FTA is determined using information about
domestic production in each potential export country. The problem is that
what is observed is the  value of the domestic offer of country B (the more
efficient) at domestic prices in B before the FTA, and the value of the excess
demand in country A at the prevailing prices in that market before the
agreement. Therefore, the observed ratio is the following:
(1)
The following relations should be observed, in order to determine the
protection regime:
• Enhanced protection
(2)
• Reduced protection
(3)
• Intermediate protection
(4)
(5)
It is not possible to observe exported domestic production valued at
the domestic price of the import country (the denominator in relation
[2]), nor the excess demand of the import country valued at the domes-
tic prices of the export country (the numerator in relation [3]). Making
some specific assumptions, it is possible to find the nonobserved values as
a function of the observed ones. In the case of the domestic offer in the
export country, it can be shown that:
(6)
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Where: is the relative efficiency of country A with respect to
country B; is the elasticity of domestic supply in country B.
In the case of the excess demand in country A, it is shown that:
(7)
Where: is the import elasticity of country A.
In conclusion, to find the values that are sought it is necessary to have
estimates of the following parameters: domestic supply elasticity in coun-
try B; import elasticity in country A; relative efficiency measured through
the domestic prices in both markets.
4. RESULTS
Industries with High Bilateral Trade Complementarity
Figures 12 to 15 present the HTC sets for US exports to MERCOSUR
as a whole, and for the exports of each MERCOSUR member to the
United States. The coordinates of each point on the plane represent the
trade complementarity levels of a certain industry’s exports in both direc-
tions. In all figures, the vertical axis is the same and corresponds to the
HTC set for US exports, while the horizontal axis corresponds to the set
of one of the MERCOSUR countries. Every industry represented
belongs to the HTC set of at least one of the economies under consider-
ation: an empty icon is an industry in the HTC set of the corresponding
MERCOSUR country (the United States), while a black icon is an
industry that belongs to both sets. The industries have been classified into
four big groups: agriculture, raw materials, fuels, and manufactures (a
square corresponds to agriculture, a cross to raw material, a circle to fuel,
and a triangle to manufactures).17
The figures suggest a markedly interindustrial pattern of trade since the
industries are concentrated along the axes and there are few black icons,
although there are rather more when Brazil is the MERCOSUR
exporter. The limited presence of black icons means that the industries in
which both sides, the United States and the MERCOSUR, have simul-
taneously an export and an import specialization are rare.18
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Figure 12. US-MERCOSUR and Argentina-US: HTC sets
Figure 13. US-MERCOSUR and Brazil-US: HTC sets
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Figure 14. US-MERCOSUR and Paraguay-US: HTC sets
Figure 15. US-MERCOSUR and Uruguay-US: HTC sets
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In the case of Argentina, the industries included in the HTC set rep-
resent approximately one-quarter of total exports. Almost 80% of the
exports with high trade complementarity with the US market correspond
to agricultural and fuel industries, with approximately equal shares.
Brazilian exports in the corresponding HTC set constitute nearly one-
half of the country’s total exports, and manufacturing industries have the
greatest share among the industries with high trade complementarity with
the US market (more than 60%).
The HTC set for exports from Paraguay to the United States represents
a low share of its total sales to foreign markets (approximately 10%) with
a majority proportion of agricultural industries (70%).
In the case of Uruguay, the exports with high trade complementarity
constitute about one-quarter of total exports and are highly concentrated
in agricultural industries, which make up more than three quarters in the
HTC set.
Finally, the HTC set for exports from the United States to the MER-
COSUR as a whole represents approximately one-half of total exports,
and manufacturing industries dominate in the HTC set with a share of
almost 90%.
The outcome from the trade complementarity analysis is also described
by Tables 3, 4, and 5 that we introduce in the next section.
Trade Opportunities and Trade Perils 
Tables 3, 4, and 5, summarize the outcome of the application of the pro-
posed methodology to the case of the MERCOSUR-United States agree-
ment. The columns show information by each country considered and con-
solidate the information for the MERCOSUR as a whole; the rows give
information about the different sets of products. The first section in all these
tables gives total exports and the other sections give the subsets of export
products that result from applying the filters and definitions included in the
three steps of the methodology; that is, the products in the high trade com-
plementarity industries set, the sensitive products set, and the subsets of sen-
sitive products classified taking into account the protection regime.
The information available for domestic production in each country at
the product level rather limited the possibility of being able to differenti-
ate the three protection regimes previously identified (see Section 2 and
Section 3, “Measure of the Trade Protection Regime”). For almost every
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Table 3. Results: Type of Products Set by Country
Total exports
High Trade
Complementarity
Sensitive Products
Reduced Protection
Enhanced &
Intermediate
Value (mill $)
Industries (#SITC4)
Products (#HS 6)
Imposed Tariff
Big division (SITC1)
Big division share 
Export share
Industries (# SITC4)
Products (# HS 6)
Imposed Tariff
Big division (SITC1)
Big division share 
Export share 
Industries (# SITC4)
Products (# HS 6)
Imposed Tariff
Big division (SITC1)
Big division share 
Export share 
Industries (# SITC4)
Products (# HS 6)
Imposed Tariff
Big division (SITC1)
Big division share 
Export share 
Industries (# SITC4)
Products (# HS 6)
Imposed Tariff
Big division (SITC1)
Argentina
25187
470
4142
4.7
0
0.38
0.26
46
323
5.12
0
0.38
0.07
23
86
15.53
0
0.48
0.06
20
47
16.99
0
0.53
0.01
10
25
22.61
7
Brazil
52053
468
4250
5.55
7
0.24
0.47
85
799
7.24
7
0.27
0.15
35
168
21.55
0
0.32
0.11
25
61
26.57
0
0.44
0.04
19
64
8.53
8
0.65
Source: Authors’ preparation using data from LAIA, USITC, and Feenstra (2000).
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Paraguay
1034
254
499
3.04
2
0.56
0.11
19
34
8.25
0
0.68
0.07
4
19
13.11
0
0.77
0.06
8
12
13.73
0
0.87
0.01
6
8.72
8
0.63
Uruguay
2631
393
1873
5.87
0
0.46
0.27
36
204
6.03
0
0.76
0.17
17
96
9.13
0
0.77
0.13
7
16
7.98
0
1.00
0.04
12
80
13.04
8
0.97
MERCOSUR
80905
478
4731
5.2
0
0.27
0.40
123
975
7.34
0
0.28
0.15
75
304
18.58
0
0.38
0.11
33
80
22.21
0
0.50
0.04
40
160
8.41
8
0.50
US
680474
482
5091
9.89
7
0.52
0.47
134
1781
9.42
7
0.62
0.38
129
1686
11.66
7
0.57
0.38
129
1686
11.66
7
0.61
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relevant sensitive product, we were able to establish with precision
whether it was a product in a reduced protection regime. Therefore,
although it was possible to identify the group of products with expansion
opportunities (they correspond to the products that are not under reduced
protection), we could only establish a subset of the perils (see Figure 11).
In other words, a product in a reduced protection regime constitutes a
peril for the importer while a product in a not-reduced protection regime
(enhanced or intermediate) constitutes an opportunity for the exporter,
and could be a peril for the importer.19
The global results are presented in Table 3. Each set of products was
characterized using the following variables of interest: share in total exports
value, number of industries (SITC four digits), number of products (HS at
six digits), imposed tariff for this particular set of products, and the big
industry division with the greatest export share within the set.
For each group of products in Table 3 the corresponding imposed tariff
is computed. The imposed tariff is the weighted average tariff that the pro-
ducers in one country face in another country’s market, the weights being
the export shares of the first country. That is, we have the tariff imposed by
the United States on each of the MERCOSUR members, and on the
MERCOSUR as a whole, and the tariff imposed by the MERCOSUR on
US exports. This variable is a good approximation of the market access
restrictions in each of the product sets. Naturally, the sensitive products reg-
ister the higher levels of protection. Brazilian exports in sensitive products
are subject to the highest tariff restrictions on access to the US market. If we
consider the whole MERCOSUR in relation to the United States we arrive
at an amazing conclusion: in spite of the fact that the average US tariff is
considerably lower than the MERCOSUR level, if the sets of products that
are important from the bilateral trade perspective are considered, then to
attain symmetrical market access conditions the United States would have
to make greater tariff concessions than would the MERCOSUR.
The results obtained in the identification of each set of products are con-
sistent and clear, so they validate the methodology. Unlike the global and
synthetic objective of the computable general equilibrium models (see
chapter III), in this case the details are relevant: we want to know which are
the particular products with expansion opportunities, and which might
contract their production levels. Each type of producer is associated with a
different political position with respect to the trade agreement. From the
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perspective of the political economy model we have in mind (Grossman
and Helpman 1995), only producer interests can, with political contribu-
tions, influence the government in the definition of its unilateral stance on
the type of free trade agreement preferred.
Our original conjecture when we set out to prepare this chapter was
that, considering the asymmetry in market size between the two economies
(MERCOSUR and the United States), exports from the United States to
MERCOSUR would enter under a regime of reduced protection (US
domestic production would be much greater than imports from MERCO-
SUR at the new prices prevailing under the FTA), but exports from MER-
COSUR would enter the United States under a regime of enhanced pro-
tection (imports from the United States are much greater than domestic
production in MERCOSUR at the prices prevailing under the FTA).
The main characteristics of the political economy of an agreement
based on the conjecture above could be summarized in the following
group of stances:
1. Export industries in MERCOSUR with sensitive products (MER-
COSUR exports with trade complementarity and an expected
increase in trade preference under the FTA) will be in favor of the
agreement (MERCOSUR opportunities).
2. Import substitution industries and regional exporters in MERCO-
SUR, in sensitive products where the United States is the exporter,
will be against the bilateral FTA (MERCOSUR perils).
3. US producers will be indifferent to the FTA; they will not gain by
it, but nor will they lose.
4. Consumers in MERCOSUR countries will gain by the effect of
FTA liberalization, and consumers in the United States will lose by
the trade diversion associated with the increased price that MER-
COSUR exports will have, and this translates into a loss of tariff
income that is transferred to the smaller economy.
These results can be characterized as an extreme case of the protection
regime typology developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995).
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A first conclusion from a reading of Table 3 is that the original con-
jecture is correct in the case of exports from the United States to MER-
COSUR. However, in exports from MERCOSUR to the United States,
a sizeable subset of products could be entering under a reduced protec-
tion regime, and so those products would be perils to US producers.
Therefore it is logical to expect opposition to the agreement by this group
of US producers. In global terms, the possible FTA agreement between
the United States and MERCOSUR is basically trade liberalizing in both
directions. This does not mean, however, that trade diversion costs will
not be incurred in the export flows from MERCOSUR to the United
States in those manufacturing industries that will enjoy the protection of
the bigger market, or that will eventually take advantage of trade reduc-
tion in the other market, as we shall see below.
Tables 4 and 5 present the main industries and products in each set,
respectively.The profile by type of industry and product allows deeper analy-
sis of the phenomenon in question. In the case of the United States, exports
to MERCOSUR in the set of industries with high trade complementarity
are concentrated in the big division 7 of the SITC classification (machinery
and transport equipment). When the disaggregation level increases (see
Tables 4 and 5), the described pattern of production is confirmed for the sets
of sensitive products and there is reduced protection both at industry level
(SITC, 4 digits) and at product level (HS, 6 digits). When it comes to indus-
tries, capital goods and telecommunications equipment stand out (see Table
4). The star products in the United States are transmission apparatus for
telecommunications, and parts and accessories for transport equipment (see
Table 5).There are no products under enhanced protection in the case of the
United States, which confirms the original conjecture.
In the sensitive products set that has the United States as the importer,
MERCOSUR exports are dominated by agricultural industries. In the
subset of reduced protection, the export share of agricultural products is
even greater. When the disaggregation level increases this pattern is con-
firmed, although some manufacturing industry exports which enter the
US market under other protection regimes (enhanced protection or the
intermediate case) could mean a peril for domestic production in the
United States. Among agricultural products under reduced protection,
those that stand out are frozen concentrated orange juice, unrefined sugar,
and tobacco (see Table 5).
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Brazilian exports account for the largest share in these three products
in MERCOSUR. In Brazil, however, manufactured products loom large
among the industries under reduced protection, as can be seen in Table
4, and in this respect the case of motor vehicles stands out because of their
considerable export share.
When it comes to agricultural products, the total production in
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay justifies the assertion that a number of
meat products should enter the US market under a reduced protection
regime (see Table 5). This is also confirmed when the aggregation is by
industry (see Table 5). In the case of Argentina, it can be seen that in the
motor vehicles industry there are various products that would be cases of
reduced protection.
With respect to the products that would benefit from protection in the
US market without affecting it (enhanced protection) or partially reduc-
ing it (intermediate case), the outstanding industries for the MERCO-
SUR as a whole are textiles, clothing, and footwear. For Brazil, rubber
products are also important, and for Argentina some products in the
motor vehicles industry are important.
A comment is in order about the products under reduced protection
in the US market in relation to those under reduced protection in the
MERCOSUR market. In light of the assumptions of the theoretical ref-
erence, model we consider that the integrating region is small compared
to the rest of the world, and therefore international prices are given. The
assumption seems reasonable for those US exports that enter the MER-
COSUR market under a reduced protection regime. However, this is not
necessarily so when the exporter is the MERCOSUR. In this case, the
increase in US imports that would result from trade barrier reduction
could lead to an increase in the international price, which would mean a
welfare improvement for MERCOSUR exporters. This could be the case
in many of the agricultural products for which MERCOSUR exports
have high trade complementarity with US imports, and the agreement
would mean an improvement in market access conditions.
Table 2.1 in Appendix II presents more exhaustive results with
respect to the sensitive products aggregated at the industry level. The
industries are classified according to the protection regimes of their
products, with information in each case about the volume of exports (in
millions of US dollars), the imposed tariff, and the number of products
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(HS six digits).20 When the MERCOSUR is an exporter, the member
countries with high trade complementarity with the US market are
identified. The products in which MERCOSUR and the United States
have simultaneously export and import specialization do not seem rele-
vant in terms of volume of trade. The products in the motor vehicles
industry are an exception to this.
Given the assumptions about political economy in the model, it was
interesting in this study to analyze the effect that the possible FTA might
have on producers’ interests. It was assumed that there are n specific factors
in the economy, one for each sector. The ownership of these factors is very
Table 4. Main Industries by Type of Set and Country
Total exports
First industry
Second industry
Third industry
High trade complementarity
First industry
Second industry
Third industry
Sensitive products
First industry
Second industry
Third industry
Reduced protection
First industry
Second industry
Third industry
Enhanced & intermediate
First industry
Second industry
Third industry
SITC
0813
3330
7810
3330
7821
0111
7821
0111
1212
0111
7821
1212
7821
8481
612A
Export
2160
1913
1312
1913
580
574
579
574
135
574
422
135
158
5
5
SITC
0711
2222
0813
0711
7849
8510
8510
7821
0585
0585
0611
7821
8510
625A
7821
Export
2541
2314
2229
2541
1571
1427
1393
1254
1161
1160
1070
1045
1355
404
209
Source: Authors’ preparation using data from LAIA, USITC, and Feenstra (2000).
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concentrated, so the objective function of each owner-producer of a specif-
ic factor in each sector will be to maximize the net benefits from the con-
tributions he has to make to influence the decision that the government is
going to make about how far to subscribe to the trade agreement (from not
accepting it to subscribing to it completely with no restrictions). Therefore,
from the point of view of the viability of the agreement, the only relevant
interest to consider is that of the producers, acting either to defend their
domestic market or seeking to export more to the new partner market.
Denominations, definitions, and an explicit methodology were
established in order to identify each sector and product.
SITC
2222
263A
0813
0111
0011
6341
0111
1211
8423
0111
1211
0611
8423
6521
0544
Export
331
178
77
46
15
7
46
5
5
46
5
5
5
2
1
SITC
0111
6512
0422
0111
8483
0344
0111
8431
8510
0111
0585
0611
8431
8510
8451
Export
344
202
194
344
39
37
344
23
18
344
4
3
23
18
17
SITC
0813
2222
7810
0711
3330
7821
7821
8510
0585
7821
0585
0111
8510
625A
7139
Export
4466
3104
2884
2542
1913
1847
1834
1424
1277
1467
1275
1201
1386
404
373
USimp
168
61
84966
3322
50648
15325
14952
13932
511
2564
418
1758
13883
3461
2930
Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR
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For each country participating in the agreement, the industries in
which that country would be relatively more inefficient (an importer),
and those in which it would be relatively more efficient (an exporter),
were determined. In this way, a first group of high trade complementar-
ity industries was defined, those in which an expansion and/or contrac-
tion of production was expected to occur. An index of trade comple-
mentarity was used, and the specialization indicators of each country
were adjusted to take account of the size of each economy.
Then, at a level of greater disaggregation, the trade policy informa-
tion was processed on the level of products so as to determine the sen-
Table 5. Main Products by Type of Set and Country
Total exports
First product
Second product
Third product
High trade complementarity
First product
Second product
Third product
Sensitive products
First product
Second product
Third product
Reduced protection
First product
Second product
Third product
Enhanced & intermediate
First product
Second product
Third product
HS
270900
230400
100590
270900
870421
020130
870421
020130
020230
870421
020130
020230
870431
870120
640610
Export
1913
1907
1280
1913
373
346
373
346
201
373
346
201
153
5
5
HS
090111
120100
230400
090111
200911
260112
200911
170111
640399
200911
170111
240120
640399
401120
401110
Export
2538
2314
2215
2538
1133
1071
1133
1070
1002
1133
1070
892
1002
228
177
Source: Authors’ preparation using data from LAIA, USITC, and Feenstra (2000).
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sitive products within the industries that had been identified. The col-
lection of sensitive products was divided into two different groups: the
perils and the opportunities.
A peril for a particular country occurs when the concession of
improved access to its market for a product in which the other country
has a comparative advantage results in the displacement of production
oriented to the domestic (regional) market.
An opportunity for a particular country occurs when the gain in
improved access for a product in which this country is an exporter and
the other an importer leads to an expansion in the domestic supply of
the exporter.
HS
120100
520100
230400
020230
010290
020120
020230
020120
020130
020230
020120
020130
620342
520812
070200
Export
331
176
73
21
15
12
21
15
12
21
12
11
21
12
11
HS
510529
020230
100630
020230
020130
020120
020230
020130
020120
020230
020130
020120
611010
640391
620331
Export
202
194
182
194
77
65
194
77
65
194
77
65
9
9
8
HS
230400
120100
090111
090111
270900
200911
200911
170111
240120
200911
170111
240120
640399
840991
870431
Export
4195
3104
2539
2539
1913
1137
1137
1119
1030
1137
1119
1030
1005
373
264
Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR
US imp
7
61
2825
2825
50648
291
291
796
478
291
796
478
5614
2930
9791
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Given that, in the agreement being evaluated, one of the parties is a
region made up of a group of countries, the only thing that has to be
taken into consideration is that, in the case of the region-country, the
region itself is considered as a domestic market.
An explicit link between the perils and opportunities definitions and
the protection regimes typology was established. An opportunity which
is not a peril for the other party is associated with a regime of enhanced
protection. A peril without a corresponding opportunity is a case of
reduced protection. In the intermediate case, a peril and an opportu-
nity co-exist.
The discrimination of situations was done by comparing domestic
offer in the exporting country with excess domestic demand in the
importer, at the price which will prevail when the agreement is in force.
The determination of the regime is a key factor for knowing the kind of
distributive effects in each case, and in particular their influence on the
objective function of the producers.
To sum up, the political economy of an eventual agreement can be
summarized in the following characteristics:
1. Agricultural producers in the United States face a peril with respect
to the constitution of an FTA with the MERCOSUR countries,
while agricultural producers in MERCOSUR could have opportu-
nities through an improvement in international prices due to liber-
alization and the resulting expansion in demand. In this situation,
the cases of frozen orange juice, sugar, tobacco, and meat of bovine
animals stand out.
2. There are no evident opportunities for US producers in the MER-
COSUR because of the reduced size of the regional market. US
exporters enter under reduced protection conditions, and interna-
tional prices should not be significantly affected as a result of the
agreement. On the other hand, producers of manufactures in the
MERCOSUR face an evident peril in their domestic market and
for their regional exports. The machinery and capital goods indus-
tries stand out, as well as some subsectors in the motor vehicle
industry.
 
Winners and Losers in a Free Trade Area Between the US and MERCOSUR
| 153 |
3. MERCOSUR opportunities, that is, those products that would
benefit from protection in the US market, are concentrated in
lighter manufactures in the footwear and clothing industries.
That is to say, MERCOSUR producers in agricultural industries in
which the zone has significant comparative advantages and in subsectors
of light manufacturing industries would have opportunities and would
face resistance to the agreement from MERCOSUR producers in the
heavier manufacturing industries of machinery and transport equip-
ment. Meanwhile, in the United States various agricultural industries
should be against the agreement. Although it is not a determinant from
a political economy point of view, in general, the consumers in both
parts would benefit from the agreement given its liberalizing character.
Therefore, we expect a net aggregate welfare gain on both sides.
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3. The general analysis in this section closely follows that presented in Grossman and
Helpman (1995), but we include a more explicit consideration of the traditional
trade creation and trade diversion effects.
4. The different industries in the economy are denoted by an index  i=0,1,....,n.
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5. Thus, the domestic price (   i z) equals one plus the initial tariff rate on 
good i in country z.
6. This is not the usual import substitution situation, since the domestic market is
not protected.
7. And areas 3 and 5 are bigger.
8. At price    i
A, country B’s supply continues to be insufficient to satisfy the
import demand of country A. Another way to obtain this specialization is by
making a suitable displacement of the demand curve to the left, given the initial
supply curve. In general, there are infinite combinations of displacements of both
curves that satisfy the enhanced protection condition, and turn good i into an
export for country B.
9. And areas 1, 2, 3, and 4 are bigger.
10. And area 6 is bigger.
11. The first step considers less disaggregated trade data due to a reason of data qual-
ity. Every step could have been developed at the same disaggregation level. The
adopted approach could mean the mis-selection of some irrelevant products, but
not the exclusion of the relevant ones.
12. One country could have an export specialization and an import specialization 
in the same industry. That is, the intersection between the sets HTCAB and
HTCBA is not necessary null.
13. In those cases we are assuming that strong adjustments are not expected.
14. In the case of the export specialization index the estimated equation was:
where GDPz is country z’s gross domestic product (the average for the period
1990–1997). The sample used includes the countries from South America,
North America, the European Union, and South East Asia. The results are not
significantly biased due to sample selection or the eventual endogeneity of GDP.
The GDP data where obtained from World Bank (2001).
15. There could be products that belong to an industry in HTCAB but are not
exported or imported. Those products cannot be sensitive. A reasonable alterna-
tive is to express the second and third condition as XC
k > X and MC
k > M,
where X and M are positive amounts of trade. This is also valid for the tariff
condition, where it is possible to require ti
AB > t , with t being a positive tariff.
For this specific study we required a tariff greater than 2%.
16. The nonreciprocal trade preferences contained in the General Preference 
System (GPS).
17. Agriculture includes SITC 0, 1, and 4 (food and live animals; beverages and tobac-
co; and animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes; respectively); raw materials
include SITC 2 (raw materials from agricultural origin); fuels include SITC 3
(mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials); manufactures include SITC 5 to 9
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(chemicals and related products; manufactured goods classified by material; machin-
ery and transport equipment; miscellaneous manufactured articles; and commodities
and transactions not classified elsewhere, respectively). The version of the SITC
classification employed in this paper is that used by Statistics Canada (see Feenstra
2000). Appendix III provides descriptions of industries and products codes.
18. We are including preferential trade (intra-MERCOSUR and intra-NAFTA) 
for the computation of trade specialization indexes. In the case of the small
members of MERCOSUR, the regional destination could represent a high
share even for the exports of products in which they are efficient producers.
19. For the classification of a sensitive product i into the reduced protection and
not-reduced protection sets, the tariff in the importer market (A) was used to
proxy the relative efficiency of the importer with respect to the exporter (B)
(ei
AB, see Section 3, “Measure of the Trade Protection Regime”). Then,
considering this proxy and the import elasticity of the importer (∑miA), we
computed the import demand of country A at the lower price of the exporter:
i
B(Di
A(  i
B) - xi
A(  i
B). Finally, we compared the adjusted import demand with
the exporter's total supply: i
B xi
B(   i
B). If the supply is (smaller) greater than
the import demand it is a (not) reduced protection case. In many reduced pro-
tection cases, B’s exports were greater than A’s imports, and, therefore, we did
not need production data (in particular, for products in which the United States
was the exporter, and agricultural products exported by MERCOSUR coun-
tries). We obtained some disaggregated production data from different sources:
World Bank (Trade and Production Database), GTAP, and IBGE. The import
elasticities were those provided by GTAP.
20. In Table II.1, IT is the imposed tariff: ITMS (ITUS) is the imposed tariff faced
by MERCOSUR (US) exports in the US (MERCOSUR) market.
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APPENDIX I
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AN FTA:
ANALYTICAL EXPRESSIONS 
1. Enhanced Protection
• Country A
(I.1)
where ∆ means variation; and WiA is the contribution of the industry i to
country A’s welfare.
• Country B
(I.2)
where ¹ are the producers’ profits; and p is the producer price.
(I.3)
(I.4)
• Zone (Z)
(I.5)
2. Reduced Protection
• Country A
(I.6)
(I.7)
where S is the consumers’ surplus; and q is the consumer price.
(I.8)
(I.9)
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(I.10)
(I.11)
(I.12)
(I.13)
(I.14)
3. Intermediate Case
• Country A
(I.15)
(I.17)
(I.18)
(I.19)
(I.20)
• Country B
(I.21)
(I.22)
(I.16)
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(I.23)
• Zone
(I.24)
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Table II. 1 Main Opportunities and Perils
SITC
0111
0412
0421
0422
0440
0481
0542
0545
0546
0574
0575
0577
0579
0585
0589
0611
0620
0730
1121
1211
1212
1213
2331
263A
266A
2919
2929
3345
4113
4232
511A
5121
513A
514A
5161
EXP
1201
1275
1119
104
48
48
99
1030
46
IT
8.26
38.78
25.48
12.67
9.97
9.16
42.44
53.07
68.36
CTRY
A,B,P,U
A,B,U
A,B,P,U
A,B
B
A
A,B,P
A,B,P
A,B
#HS
6
6
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
US Perils
REDUCED
EXP
3
2
5
IT
13.02
8.35
20.42
CTRY
A
A,B
B
#HS
5
1
1
NOT REDUCED
MERCOSUR EXPORTER US EXPORTER
MS Perils
REDUCED
EXP
3593
416
613
4890
251
341
591
381
375
1008
839
30
1287
2143
947
255
213
359
473
643
2626
941
2356
1606
694
IT
5.00
8.09
10.96
8.00
15.14
5.00
13.38
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
14.00
7.81
6.01
11.55
5.14
7.29
14.00
6.02
10.40
6.11
9.82
8.41
9.35
5.27
#HS
1
2
2
1
10
9
15
1
1
13
18
3
14
6
19
8
16
4
6
2
44
25
59
25
13
MS Opportunities
(eventual) US Perils
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MS REDUCED AND US REDUCED MS NOT RED. AND US RED.
MERCOSUR AND US EXPORTERS
Common Perils
EXMS
12
14
44
91
198
9
ITMS
2.67
0.61
32.51
19.60
5.53
5.53
CTRY
A
A
A,B
A,B,P
B
B
MS Opportunities. MS Perils
and (eventual) US Perils
EXUS
197
156
231
282
733
38
ITUS
10.00
10.0
14.00
15.09
8.49
4.17
#HS
1
2
7
5
9
2
EXMS
0
7
0
44
36
ITMS
1.12
6.17
3.86
5.02
4.50
CTRY
A
A,B
A,B,P
B
B
EXUS
146
88
87
1470
224
ITUS
10.00
14.00
2.40
5.77
6.89
#HS
5
3
1
16
1
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Table II. 1 Continued
SITC
5162
5169
5221
5224
5225
5231
5239
5415
5513
5530
5542
582A
584A
591A
5922
5989
612A
6210
625A
6282
6289
6428
6521
6575
6577
6584
6623
6638
6664
6665
6716
6811
692A
6931
6953
EXP
97
25
3
166
428
IT
4.36
5.15
8.96
9.94
4.13
CTRY
A, B
A, B, U
B
B
A, B
#HS
4
1
2
5
4
US Perils
REDUCED
EXP
65
14
19
1
26
1
IT
9.36
8.27
9.38
13.30
8.84
3.06
CTRY
A,B,U
B,P
B
U
B
A,B
#HS
2
7
7
1
1
4
NOT REDUCED
MERCOSUR EXPORTER US EXPORTER
MS Perils
REDUCED
EXP
412
316
647
220
505
1734
173
443
830
2710
1338
4827
711
1631
8221
982
351
59
1182
1205
378
322
101
516
820
289
772
IT
7.02
11.73
5.32
7.81
6.29
8.74
5.86
5.95
12.97
17.99
14.31
11.45
10.18
12.72
8.97
13.11
13.61
14.00
13.56
14.37
15.61
9.29
13.94
6.66
14.58
14.00
18.00
#HS
28
4
21
12
18
97
10
7
16
19
9
20
10
5
52
18
10
5
10
11
12
5
10
4
9
3
25
MS Opportunities
(eventual) US Perils
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MS REDUCED AND US REDUCED MS NOT RED. AND US RED.
MERCOSUR AND US EXPORTERS
Common Perils
EXMS
162
29
12
17
11
ITMS
5.40
2.97
3.29
3.79
2.04
CTRY
A,B
B
A,B
B
A,B
MS Opportunities. MS Perils
and (eventual) US Perils
EXUS
36
33
74
69
21
ITUS
6.00
4.67
5.64
14.00
13.76
#HS
1
1
1
3
2
EXMS
404
4
ITMS
3.70
4.36
CTRY
B
B
EXUS
2125
46
ITUS
16.00
14.00
#HS
2
1
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Table II. 1 Continued
SITC
6954
6996
712A
7133
7139
716A
7188
7211
7212
7213
7219
723A
7252
7259
727A
7283
7284
7361
7369
7371
7413
7414
7416
742A
743A
7441
7442
7451
7452
7493
7499
7511
7591
762A
7641
EXP IT CTRY #HS
US Perils
REDUCED
EXP
1
IT
4.37
CTRY
B
#HS
1
NOT REDUCED
MERCOSUR EXPORTER US EXPORTER
MS Perils
REDUCED
EXP
1502
531
651
455
7545
3098
367
336
1678
87
450
7941
257
434
658
780
13514
1944
1693
187
1865
3838
1792
2593
2477
1037
4547
589
2788
902
1366
42
1375
4904
IT
16.64
15.60
14.00
14.00
16.41
14.29
14.00
14.00
14.94
14.00
14.00
8.23
11.45
14.00
13.25
14.00
13.02
13.91
12.94
8.50
13.82
14.87
13.67
14.03
12.46
14.00
11.16
13.46
12.81
14.03
14.30
18.14
13.01
11.97
#HS
16
10
4
3
8
20
9
7
12
3
8
21
5
3
11
7
39
52
5
4
23
11
12
11
7
8
30
7
27
3
13
4
4
8
MS Opportunities
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MS REDUCED AND US REDUCED MS NOT RED. AND US RED.
MERCOSUR AND US EXPORTERS
Common Perils
EXMS
154
38
ITMS
2.50
4.50
CTRY
B
MS Opportunities. MS Perils
and (eventual) US Perils
EXUS
392
171
ITUS
18.00
16.00
#HS
1
1
EXMS
373
12
ITMS
1.94
3.71
CTRY
A, B
B
EXUS
2801
493
ITUS
15.20
14.13
#HS
1
3
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Table II. 1 Continued
SITC
7649
771A
7732
7742
7752
7757
7781
7782
7783
7788
7821
7822
7849
792A
8421
8422
8423
8429
8431
8432
8442
8451
8471
8481
8483
8510
8720
8745
8748
8749
8813
8822
8921
8946
895A
8982
EXP
21
56
38
IT
7.40
4.00
15.48
CTRY
B
A
B
#HS
1
1
3
US Perils
REDUCED
EXP
15
5
5
10
23
3
0
17
3
13
1386
IT
18.43
16.89
9.50
12.71
15.23
16.80
6.60
12.33
6.68
5.63
9.02
CTRY
U
U
P
U
U
U
B
U
U
A,U
B,U
#HS
7
3
2
31
7
4
5
4
8
2
17
NOT REDUCED
MERCOSUR EXPORTER US EXPORTER
MS Perils
REDUCED
EXP
17493
3236
488
1232
741
879
1418
702
1980
6073
798
1099
28041
9
8240
758
13410
2574
1876
2242
36
248
831
211
IT
8.77
15.86
16.00
9.09
20.00
18.85
16.20
17.19
17.47
13.04
14.00
17.08
14.75
20.00
10.63
13.24
12.16
11.89
11.63
9.02
11.82
20.00
17.07
16.74
#HS
28
11
6
6
6
9
13
9
13
32
2
11
15
2
14
7
39
9
20
32
4
8
21
10
MS Opportunities
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MS REDUCED AND US REDUCED MS NOT RED. AND US RED.
MERCOSUR AND US EXPORTERS
Common Perils
EXMS
1467
156
ITMS
18.99
2.00
CTRY
A, B
B
MS Opportunities. MS Perils
and (eventual) US Perils
EXUS
1893
240
TUS
19.39
16.00
#HS
4
1
EXMS
367
0
ITMS
19.08
1.07
CTRY
A, B
EXUS
5988
62
ITUS
20.00
9.57
#HS
4
1
Table III. 1 Main Industry Descriptions
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APPENDIX III
INDUSTRIES AND PRODUCTS DESCRIPTIONS
SITC
0011
0111
0344
0711
0813
3330
0544
0585
0611
1211
1212
2222
263A
3330
612A
625A
6341
6512
6521
7139
7284
7649
776A
7810
7821
7849
792A
8423
8431
8451
8481
8483
8510
DESCRIPTION
BOVINE ANIMALS INCLUDING BUFFLAO - LIVE 
MEAT FROM BOVINE ANIMALS - FRESH, CHILLED OR FROZEN
FISH FILLETS - FROZEN
COFFEE - ROASTED, UNROASTED, and DECAFFINATED 
OIL-CAKE & OTHER RESIDUES (EXCEPT DREGS)
OIL & CRUDE OIL OBTAINED FROM BITUMIN. MINERALS
TOMATOES - FRESH OR CHILLED
JUICES - BOTH FRUIT & VEGET.(INCL.GRAPE MUST) UNFERMENTED
SUGARS - BEET AND CANE, both RAW and SOLID
TOBACCO - UNSTRIPPED
TOBACCO,WHOLLY OR PARTLY STRIPPED
SOYBEANS
COTTON
OIL & CRUDE OIL OBTAINED FROM BITUMIN. MINERALS
LEATHER MANUFACTURERS - COMPOSITION LEATHER NES
RUBBER TIRES, TIRE CASES, etc.
LUMBER CUT LENGTHWISE - UNFINISHED 
YARN - WOOL OR ANIMAL HAIR (INCLUDING WOOL TOPS)
COTTON FABRICS -WOVEN,UNBLEACHED, NOT MERCERIZED
INTERNAL COMBUSTION PISTON ENGINE PARTS -  OF 713.2-/713.8-
MACHINES & APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED or 
PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES
PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76-
THERMIONIC, COLD and PHOTO-CATHODE VALVES, 
TUBES and PARTS
PASSENGER CARS, FOR TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS and GOODS
MOTOR VEHICLES FOR TRANSPORT OF GOODS and MATERIALS
OTHER MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS & ACCESSORIES 
AIRCRAFT & ASSOCIATED PARTS and EQUIPMENT
TROUSERS, PANTS ETC. COMPOSED OF TEXTILE FABRICS
COATS AND JACKETS OF TEXTILE FABRICS
JERSEYS, PULL-OVERS, TWINSETS, CARDIGANS - KNITTED
ARTICLES OF CLOTHING AND APPARELY - LEATHER ACCESSORIES 
FUR CLOTHING, ARTICLES MADE OF FURSKINS
FOOTWEAR
Winners and Losers in a Free Trade Area Between the US and MERCOSUR
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Table III. 2 Main Product Descriptions
HS
010290
020120
020130
020230
070200
090111
100590
100630
120100
170111
200911
230400
240110
240120
260112
270900
271000
401110
401120
510529
520100
520812
611010
620331
DESCRIPTION
LIVE BOVINE ANIMALS (EXCLUDING PURE-BRED FOR BREEDING)
FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE CUTS, UNBONED 
(EXCLUDING CARCASES AND 1/2 CARCASES)
FRESH OR CHILLED BOVINE MEAT, BONELESS
BONELESS, FROZEN MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS
TOMATOES, FRESH OR CHILLED
COFFEE (EXCLUDING ROASTED AND DECAFFEINATED)
CORN (EXCLUDING SEED)
SEMI-MILLED OR WHOLLY MILLED RICE
SOY BEANS, WHETHER OR NOT BROKEN
RAW CANE SUGAR (EXCLUDING ADDED FLAVORING OR COLORING)
FROZEN ORANGE JUICE, WITH AND WITHOUT ADDED SUGAR 
OR OTHER SWEETENERS (EXCLUDING FERMENTED OR 
THOSE CONTAINING SPIRITS)
OIL-CAKE AND OTHER SOLID RESIDUES, WHETHER OR NOT
GROUND OR IN THE FORM OF PELLETS, RESULTING FROM THE
EXTRACTION OF SOYA-BEAN OIL
TOBACCO, NOT STEMMED OR STRIPPED
TOBACCO, PARTLY OR WHOLLY STEMMED OR STRIPPED, 
OTHERWISE UNMANUFACTURED
AGGLOMERATED IRON ORES AND CONCENTRATES 
ECSC (EXCLUDING ROASTED IRON PYRITES)
PETROLEUM OILS AND OILS OBTAINED FROM BITUMINOUS
MINERALS, CRUDE
LUBRICATING PETROLEUM OILS OR BITUMINOUS OILS >70% 
(SITC 3345)
NEW PNEUMATIC TIRES - COMPOSED OF RUBBER AND UTILIZED ON
MOTOR CARS, INCLUDING ESTATE AND RACING CARS
NEW PNEUMATIC TYRES, OF RUBBER, OF A KIND USED FOR 
BUSES AND LORRIES (EXCLUDING TYRES WITH LUG, CORNER 
OR SIMILAR TREADS)
WOOL, COMBED (EXCLUDING THAT IN FRAGMENTS 
AND OPEN TOPS)
COTTON, NEITHER CARDED NOR COMBED
PLAIN WOVEN FABRICS OF COTTON, CONTAINING >=85 % 
COTTON BY WEIGHT AND WEIGHING >100 G TO  200 G PER M2,
UNBLEACHED
JERSEYS, PULLOVERS, CARDIGANS, WAISTCOATS AND SIMILAR
ARTICLES, OF WOOL OR FINE ANIMAL HAIR, KNITTED OR
CROCHETED (EXCLUDING WADDED WAISTCOATS)
MEN’S OR BOYS’ JACKETS AND BLAZERS OF WOOL OR FINE
ANIMAL HAIR (EXCLUDING KNITTED OR CROCHETED, AND WIND-
JACKETS AND SIMILAR ARTICLES)
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WOMEN’S OR GIRLS’ JACKETS AND BLAZERS OF COTTON
(EXCLUDING KNITTED OR CROCHETED, WIND-JACKETS 
AND SIMILAR ARTICLES)
FOOTWEAR WITH, RUBBER, PLASTICS OR COMPOSITION LEATHER
OUTER SOLES, WITH UPPERS COMPOSED OF LEATHER, COVERING
THE ANKLE 
FOOTWEAR WITH RUBBER, PLASTIC OR COMPOSITION LEATHER
OUTER SOLES, WITH LEATHER UPPERS
UPPERS AND PARTS THEREOF (EXCLUDING STIFFENERS AND
GENERAL PARTS MADE OF ASBESTOS)
ALUMINIUM, NOT ALLOYED, UNWROUGHT
PARTS SUITABLE FOR USE SOLELY OR PRINCIPALLY WITH SPARK-
IGNITION INTERNAL COMBUSTION PISTON ENGINES, N.E.S.
PARTS AND ACCESSORIES FOR AUTOMATIC DATA-PROCESSING
MACHINES OR FOR OTHER MACHINES OF HEADING 8471, N.E.S.
TRANSMISSION APPARATUS INCORPORATING RECEPTION
APPARATUS, FOR RADIO-TELEPHONY, RADIO-TELEGRAPHY, 
RADIO-BROADCASTING OR TELEVISION
MONOLITHIC DIGITAL INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AS METAL 
OXIDE SEMICONDUCTOR CIRCUITS, OF MOS TYPE
(EXCLUDINGSMART CARDS)
ROAD TRACTORS FOR SEMI-TRAILERS
MOTOR VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS, WITH
COMPRESSION-IGNITION INTERNAL COMBUSTION PISTON
ENGINES OF A GROSS VEHICLE WEIGHT =<5 TON
MOTOR VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS, WITH SPARK-
IGNITION INTERNAL COMBUSTION PISTON ENGINES, OF A GROSS
VEHICLE WEIGHT =<5 TONS
PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF BODIES FOR TRACTORS, MOTOR
VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSPORT OF TEN OR MORE PERSONS,
MOTOR CARS…
PARTS AND ACCESSORIES, FOR TRACTORS, MOTOR VEHICLES FOR
THE TRANSPORT OF TEN OR MORE PERSONS, MOTOR CARS.
AIRPLANES AND OTHER POWERED AIRCRAFT OF AN OF AN
UNLADEN WEIGHT >15000 KG (EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS AND
DIRIGIBLES)
PARTS FOR AIRPLANES OR HELICOPTERS, N.E.S. (EXCLUDING
THOSE FOR GLIDERS)
620342
640391
640399
640610
760110
840991
847330
852520
854213
870120
870421
870431
870829
870899
880240
880330
